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ABSTRACT
The United States continues to lag behind other countries in its adoption of health
information technology. A failure to increase adoption will jeopardize the nation’s
ability to reduce medical errors, address the rapid growth of healthcare costs, and enact
effective healthcare reform. Health information technology (HIT) implementation
success factors as perceived by healthcare executives and industry experts are well
documented in the literature. Few studies, however, have focused on the perceptions of
HIT end users such as physicians and nurses. The purpose of this exploratory case study
was to describe the strategies, actions, and other factors that contribute to the successful
implementation of HIT as perceived by 29 HIT end users at a 613-bed adult hospital and
7 end users at a 272-bed children's hospital. Interview data, secondary sources, and
investigator observations were analyzed in three phases consistent with the core
elements of qualitative data analysis and led to the emergence of eight unique themes
which suggest factors that allow or inhibit HIT implementation success. These factors
include (a) the end users’ understanding of the implementation goals, (b) the
appropriateness of the selected HIT system, (c) the usability of the system, (d) the
adequacy of the supporting infrastructure, (e) the quality of the end user training, (f) the
adequacy of the on-site support, (g) the resulting impact to nursing and physician
workflows, and (h) the resulting quality of nursing and physician documentation.
Conclusions drawn from the exploration include: (a) communication between the
decision-makers and the end users was inadequate; (b) poor usability design, lack of
supporting infrastructure, and lack of workflow optimization brought on serious side
effects including a decrease in the quality of physician documentation, an emphasis on
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financially-driven versus care-driven charting, and disruption to provider-patient and
physician-nurse relationships; (c) specialized care environments require equally
specialized HIT systems if they are to operate optimally; and (d) less end user training
prior to implementation in favor of more post-activation on-site support and follow-up
training would have represented a more effective use of resources.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Background
In 2000, at a time when lower ranking causes of death such as motor vehicle
accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS were receiving the greatest public attention, the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported that medical errors cause an estimated 44,000 to
98,000 deaths per year in hospitals, making them the eighth leading cause of death in the
United States (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). The IOM released a follow-up
report in July of 2003, sponsored by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services, illuminating the enormous potential to improve the quality of patient care
through the use of health information technology (Committee on Data Standards for
Patient Safety, 2003). The report outlined eight core functions that electronic health
record systems should be capable of performing in order to promote greater patient
safety including test results management, medication order entry management, and
decision support. In November of 2003, the IOM reiterated “the vital role of information
technology in designing a safer health care system” (p. 29) by calling for a standardsbased national health information infrastructure to guide the collection and interchange
of patient safety data (Aspden, Corrigan, Wolcott, & Erickson, 2004).
Rising public concern as a result of the IOM reports, as well as failed attempts at
the state level to develop a community-wide approach to health information exchange,
prompted action at the national level (Frohlich, Karp, Smith, & Sujansky, 2007). In
2002, the Joint Commission established a National Patient Safety Goals program to help
healthcare organizations address patient safety concerns (Joint Commission, 2009). In
2004, former President George W. Bush signed an executive order establishing a new
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position, National Health Information Technology Coordinator, charged with developing
a nationwide interoperable health information technology infrastructure by 2014 (United
States Government Printing Office, 2004). The former President’s executive order led to
the creation of the American Health Information Community (AHIC) in 2005. The
AHIC was charged with making “recommendations to the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services on how to accelerate the development and
adoption of health information technology” (United States Department of Health and
Human Services, n.d., para. 1). Over the course of 25 meetings, the AHIC advanced
more than 200 recommendations addressing various topics such as standards and
certification, social and cultural issues, and security and privacy. Now incorporated as a
public-private organization known as the National eHealth Collaborative (NeHC), the
organization continues to develop a unified approach to realize the former President’s
vision.
Problem Statement
While more recent studies do show that the overall quality of healthcare is
improving (Esimai, 2005; Hosford, 2008), the average annual rate of improvement has
declined from 2.3% over the years 1994 to 2005 to a modest 1.5% over the shorter
reporting period of 2000 to 2005 (Brady, Ho, & Clancy, 2008). Moreover, the United
States continues to lag behind other countries in its adoption of health information
technology (Chin, 2004; Jha et al., 2009). A 2006 survey of primary care physicians
found that only 29% of those in the United States were using electronic medical record
systems, compared to 98% in the Netherlands, 92% in New Zealand, 89% in the United
Kingdom, 79% in Australia, and 42% in Germany (Schoen, Osborn, Huynh, Doty, &
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Zapert, 2006). A failure to increase health information technology adoption in the United
States will jeopardize the nation’s ability to reduce medical errors, address the rapid
growth of healthcare costs, and enact effective healthcare reform (Blumenthal, 2009;
Davenport, 2007).
Purpose Statement
During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama vowed to invest 10 billion
dollars a year over the first five years of his presidency to encourage broad adoption of
health information technology (Obama for America, n.d.). Indeed, the recently passed
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocates over 20 billion dollars “to
aid in the development of a robust IT infrastructure for healthcare and to assist providers
and other entities in adopting and using health IT” (Healthcare Information and
Management Systems Society, 2009, p. 1). Funding and incentives alone, however, will
not necessarily lead to successful implementations and increased health information
technology adoption. Without a solid understanding of the factors which influence the
success of an implementation, healthcare organizations risk implementation failure
(Goldstein & Zhang, 2009).
Health information technology (HIT) implementation success factors as
perceived by healthcare executives and industry experts are well documented in the
literature. Few studies, however, have focused on the perceptions of HIT end users such
as physicians and nurses (Jensen & Aanestad, 2007). The purpose of this exploratory
case study was to describe the strategies, actions, and other factors that contribute to the
successful implementation of HIT as perceived by HIT end users at two California
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hospitals. That is, this study sought the perspective of the HIT end user in answering the
question: How is HIT successfully implemented?
Defining Success
The definition of success in the context of HIT implementation was explored at
the American Medical Informatics Association’s Fall 2006 Symposium. Kaplan and
Harria-Salamone (2009) summarized the discussion among symposium participants as
follows:
Success may be defined as simply getting the application or system turned on,
getting people to use it, and getting at least grudging acceptance, with the caveat
that grudging acceptance can turn to non-acceptance. It might entail only offering
even “small successes” to users. Problems are compounded in that what works
for one group, such as pharmacists, may not work for another group, such as
nurses, and those who gain may not be those who actually do the work. For these
reasons, there is little agreement about what “success” or “failure” is. (p. 294)
Indeed, a review of the literature does not reveal a singular measure of success
for technology implementations. Some consider fulfilling the goals and objectives in the
project plan as an indicator of success, which “may or may not be accurate depending on
the quality of the project plan” (Padilla, 2007, para. 2). For others, “the answer to how
success is defined for an IT project is to be on time, on budget, with zero defects” (para.
2). Another approach is to measure success based on a costs versus benefits analysis,
that is, “one totals the costs of developing a system and compares them with the dollar
benefits resulting from the system” (Egeland, 2009, para. 6). While in theory, this
sounds like a reasonable approach, benefits are often difficult to quantify in financial
terms (Devaraj & Kohli, 2003; Egeland, 2009). Other indicators of success discussed in
the literature include the level of system usage, user satisfaction, and impact on
productivity and output quality (Egeland, 2009).
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Ultimately, success is in the eye of the stakeholder; different people define
success in different ways (Glass, 2005; Kaplan & Harria-Salamone, 2009; Padilla,
2007). For the purposes of this study and its case selection, the investigator operationally
defined success as active usage of the new application or system which demonstrates at
least nominal acceptance from both a technical and a cultural perspective.
Significance of the Study
A successful HIT implementation is dependent on a leadership team that
demonstrates a strong understanding of the end user, yet many organizations fail to
acknowledge this dependency:
New technology is often developed and evaluated from an organizational point of
view. The focus is placed on how organizational processes and activities will be
supported by technology, rather than how the individual user’s needs and
preferences are impacted. The organization may initiate and fund the
implementation of an IT project, but it is the end user who actually uses the
technology to perform his or her job. (Bernstein, McCreless, & Cote, 2007, p. 22)
Moreover, little exists in the literature to help leaders develop such an
understanding of their end users. By attempting to address this knowledge gap, the
investigator hoped to assist healthcare organizations in the planning and execution of
successful HIT implementation projects and to assist in the national effort to increase
HIT adoption. As demonstrated by the recent passage of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, the adoption of HIT is a high priority for the United States
government.
Delimitations
The specific cases explored in this study included an April 2008 HIT
implementation at an adult hospital and a September 2008 HIT implementation at a
children’s hospital. Several factors led to the selection of these two cases: (a) both
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implementation events occurred relatively recently; (b) both were convenience cases,
that is, both hospitals represented populations that could be conveniently sampled by the
investigator (Creswell, 2007); and (c) an exploration of two cases leading to a cross-case
synthesis would likely generate richer findings than a single-case analysis (Yin, 2009).
Though technicians, therapists, social workers, and numerous other ancillary
clinical staff use HIT at both hospitals, the dominant HIT end users are physicians and
nurses. Interviewees were therefore selected from within the physician and nurse
populations at each hospital. Interviews were conducted between January 15 and April
12 of 2010.
Definition of Terms
The term health information technology (HIT) is used throughout this study as an
umbrella term intended to cover a variety of software and hardware systems used in the
healthcare field. These include but are not limited to computerized physician order entry
(CPOE), electronic medical record (EMR), electronic health record (EHR), and clinical
information systems, as well as bar code scanners and vital sign devices.
Organization of the Study
The remainder of the study is organized in the following manner. Chapter Two
presents a review of relevant literature concerned with the benefits of HIT,
implementation challenges, implementation success factors, and organizational change.
Chapter Three delineates the proposed research design and methodology for the study.
The interview protocol as well as the sampling, data collection, and analysis procedures
are described. The study findings, including a cross-case synthesis, are presented in
Chapter Four. Chapter Five presents a summary of the study, a discussion of the findings
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as related to the literature, conclusions, and recommendations for further research. The
study concludes with a reference list and appendix.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Introduction
The Joint Commission, an independent, not-for-profit organization that accredits
and certifies more than 15,000 healthcare organizations and programs in the United
States (Joint Commission, n.d.), establishes National Patient Safety Goals annually and
surveys accredited healthcare organizations to ensure that the goals are implemented
(Joint Commission, 2009). Indeed, a quick perusal of hospital websites reveals a
common thread among their various missions, visions, and values: all are committed to
providing quality patient care (Cleveland Clinic, n.d.; John Hopkins Medicine, n.d.;
Mayo Clinic, n.d.; Stanford Hospital and Clinics, n.d.).
While there are many ways in which healthcare organizations can improve the
quality of care that they provide, the adoption of health information technology (HIT) is
arguably the most talked about in recent years. The Institute of Medicine, a longtime
advocate for the adoption of HIT, recently suggested that greater use of information
technologies in prescribing and dispensing medications will reduce the number of
medication errors (Aspden, Wolcott, Bootman, & Cronenwett, 2007). In 2008, the
Association of Perioperative Registered Nurses went as far as to publish an article that
specifically outlined how information technologies could help healthcare organizations
meet each Joint Commission National Patient Safety Goal (Catalano & Fickenscher,
2008).
Numerous studies and reports suggest that broader adoption of HIT will lead to
greater patient safety and quality of care, yet the United States continues to lag behind
other countries in its adoption of HIT (Chin, 2004; Jha et al., 2009; Schoen et al., 2006).
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This chapter begins by reviewing literature that supports the implementation of HIT as a
way to reduce medication administration errors and improve overall operational
effectiveness. The following section attempts to account for the lag in HIT adoption by
focusing on the challenges presented by HIT implementation.
HIT implementation success factors as perceived by healthcare executives and
industry experts are fairly well documented. The third section of this chapter presents a
review of the aforementioned literature. To establish a theoretical construct for this
study, the fourth section presents a review of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step process for
leading organizational change. The chapter concludes with a summary.
Benefits of Health Information Technology
Health information technology (HIT) promises myriad benefits to its adopters,
including but not limited to increased patient safety, improved quality of patient care,
automated sharing of health information, increased productivity through improved
workflows, reduced cost of services, and reduced expenses associated with paper-based
records (Goldschmidt, 2005). A study of 98 Florida hospitals found that “those with the
most sophisticated and mature IT infrastructures performed significantly better on the
largest number of PSIs [Patient Safety Indicators]” (Menachemi, Saunders, Chukmaitov,
Mathhews, & Brooks, 2007, p. 398).
Several studies, in particular, have shown that HIT adoption leads to a reduction
in medication administration errors. Incidences of adverse drug events were reduced by
75% when a Salt Lake City hospital implemented a computerized physician order entry
(CPOE) system (Evans et al., 1998). A similar system adopted by a Boston hospital led
to a 19% reduction in medication errors and a 23% increase in the appropriate use of
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medications in high-risk clinical situations (Bates et al., 1998). Studies have also shown
that bar code-assisted dispensing systems, when used in conjunction with CPOE
systems, reduce medical administration errors. Of the three configurations of bar code
technology implemented at a 735-bed tertiary care academic medical center in 2003,
“the two configurations that required staff to scan all doses had a 93% to 96% relative
reduction in the incidence of target dispensing errors” (Poon et al., 2006, p. 426).
In addition to a reduction in medication administration errors, studies indicate
that HIT adoption leads to operational improvements. A review of 68 studies concerning
computer-based decision support systems found that 43 out of 63 studies supported HIT
adoption as a means to improve physician performance and 6 out of 14 studies supported
HIT adoption as a means to improve patient outcomes (Hunt, Haynes, Hanna, & Smith,
1998). Use of electronic medical record systems produced a net gain of 86,400 dollars
per physician over a five year period for a group of primary care physicians studied in
Boston (Wang et al., 2003). And a more recent study “combining primary survey data
from Florida hospitals and secondary data from two government agencies” (p. 5) found
that the adoption of clinical HIT systems led to significant gains in operational
performance (Bhattacherjee, Hikmet, Menachemi, Kayhan, & Brooks, 2007).
Despite these and other studies that highlight the benefits of HIT, the recent
passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, allocating over 20
billion dollars to HIT, has generated a wave of criticism. Many physicians continue to
suggest that technology impersonalizes the doctor-patient encounter and impedes
physicians’ ability to make quality connections with their patients (Armstrong-Coben,
2009), although at least one study debunks such claims (Menachemi, Beitsch, & Brooks,
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2008). Drs. Groopman and Hartzband (2009) of the Israel Deaconess Medical Center in
Boston argue that the benefits of HIT fail to justify the costs of implementation, citing
the potential for propagating misdiagnoses and the burden of “checking off scores of
boxes on the computer screen to satisfy insurance requirements” (para. 11) as major HIT
downsides. HIT proponents, and even cautious supporters, however, argue that a welldesigned system utilizing automated prediction tools, statistical models, and a smart user
interface developed with the end-user in mind would overcome the HIT shortcomings
identified in Groopman and Hartzband’s editorial (Brody, 2008; Jakulin, 2009).
Implementation Challenges
A recent survey of all acute care hospitals that are members of the American
Hospital Association (AHA) found the most commonly cited HIT implementation
barriers to be “inadequate capital for purchase (74%), concerns about maintenance costs
(44%), resistance on the part of physicians (36%), unclear return on investment (32%),
and lack of availability of staff with adequate expertise in information technology
(30%)” (Jha et al., 2009, p. 1632). The financial barriers are not altogether surprising
considering that the leading countries in HIT adoption are supported by national
investment in IT capacity (Schoen et al., 2006). Up until the recent passage of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the United States had no national
plan to financially support HIT adoption and instead “relied primarily on market-driven,
individual care systems (such as Kaiser Permanente or the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs) or physician investment to build IT capacity” (p. 568).
Moreover, as the AHA survey confirms, healthcare organizations are often
unable to accurately estimate the business value of their HIT investments (Devaraj &
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Kohli, 2003). Though healthcare executives appear to be paying more attention to
“intangible metrics in determining the business value of IT. . . . [such as the] influence of
IT on brand name, customer satisfaction, business relationships, core processes, and
patients” (Solovy & Chaiken, 2003, p. 20), they continue to favor a financially driven
definition of return on investment (ROI). Given such a narrow definition of ROI, the
costs of HIT adoption, including the acquisition of qualified IT staff, are often difficult
for healthcare organizations to justify (Thielst, 2007b).
While the AHA hospitals were less likely to cite financial barriers if they had
already adopted some form of HIT, all surveyed hospitals were equally likely to cite
physician resistance as a barrier (Jha et al., 2009). Indeed, physician resistance to change
is a well-documented HIT adoption barrier (Freudenheim, 2004; Massaro, 2005; Poon et
al., 2004). In the oft-cited case of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, physician resistance
forced the organization to unplug its computerized physician order entry system less
than four months into its operation (Morrissey, 2004).
Physician resistance is often attributed to a perception that the change will
disrupt current workflows, a fear of being perceived as incompetent, or a simple lack of
understanding regarding the nature and purpose of the proposed change (LeTourneau,
2004). Such perceptions and lack of understanding are not unwarranted. Physicians and
other healthcare professionals are routinely critical of the disruptive, inefficient, and
time-consuming tasks that poorly designed systems impose (Groopman & Hartzband,
2009; Jensen & Aanestad, 2007). For older, less technology savvy physicians,
particularly those with limited keyboard dexterity, moving from paper to electronic
documentation is a struggle (Valerius, 2007). Some organizations have even developed
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“positions such as chief medical information officer to champion and problem-solve
physician processes related to this change” (p. 57).
Implementation Success Factors
Bernstein et al. (2007) posit that five constants of information technology
adoption “persist regardless of the state of IT in healthcare: (1) budget, (2) supportive
leadership, (3) project management, (4) implementation, and (5) end user involvement”
(p. 17). A review of the literature reveals that HIT implementation success factors
generally do align with one of these constants. The following section will therefore use
the five constants as an organizational framework.
Budget. IT budgets are often inadequate given the investment demands of a
successful HIT implementation. Budgets must allow for the acquisition of sufficiently
numbered and qualified resources to ensure an appropriate distribution of work
(Bernstein et al., 2007). Bernstein et al. suggest that:
Healthcare executives should expand their definition of ROI to include both
tangible and intangible qualities of value when evaluating the IT budget because
the benefits of new IT will be realized by not only increased profitability or
decreased costs, but also by improved patient outcomes, enhanced employee
morale, and greater quality of services. (p. 23)
While tangible, financially driven metrics are more readily available and
measured, “change management is only successful to the degree that healthcare leaders
are able to measure and manage the intangibles” (Atchison, 1999, p. 6). To capture the
intangible metrics, IT managers should assess new technologies before engaging in fullscale implementations (Sallas, Lane, Mathews, Watkins, & Wiley-Patton, 2007). Sallas
et al. completed a case study involving the pilot implementation of a handheld
medication administration device and found that the utilization of an iterative assessment
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approach allowed IT managers to evaluate the efficacy of the project based on multiple
criteria, including impact on patient outcomes and provider workflows. Sallas et al.
concluded that “the most effective way to know if a technology is worth the time and
effort spent to implement it, is to perform an assessment” (p. 44).
In addition to expanding their definition of ROI, IT managers must minimize
costs by leveraging external resources effectively. Loppnow (2007) interviewed
healthcare executives across eight different healthcare organizations nationally
recognized for their successful implementation of HIT and found that all, to varying
extents, relied on outside vendors to “satisfy the core functional needs of the IT
infrastructure. . . . [and] concentrated [their] IT human resources on understanding
clinical and operational processes, and on providing training and support to the operating
units” (p. 88). Moreover, most executives agree that buying standardized off-the-shelf
application solutions versus developing applications in-house is a more cost-effective
approach towards implementation and ongoing maintenance (Traylor, 2006).
Supportive leadership. Physicians and other healthcare professionals see their
core mission as that of providing patient care and are therefore unlikely to invest much
time and effort into anything that is not perceived “as an explicit way to improve the
overall patient treatment” (Jensen & Aanestad, 2007, p. 38). Without a sense of urgency,
few people are willing to invest the time and effort demanded by a change project
(Kotter, 1996). A successful implementation is therefore dependent on a leadership team
capable of championing the need for change (Middleton, 2005). Healthcare executives
and managers must provide continuous support and ensure that IT goals “are aligned
with the organization’s mission, values, and strategic objectives” (Bernstein et al., 2007,
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p. 23). They must also possess a complete understanding of any new technology
including its capabilities, limitations, and impact on existing workflows (Thielst, 2007b).
The absence of a technology-grounded leadership team can lead to the inappropriate
outsourcing of IT functions that are best managed internally, such as organizational
strategy development and execution (Blair, 2005).
A leadership survey conducted by the Healthcare Information and Management
Systems Society and Hewlett-Packard asked over 1000 healthcare IT executives to name
the most important skill required of today’s healthcare chief information officer.
Business strategy development was named by 49% of the respondents (Simpson, 1995).
Similarly, when Loppnow (2007) interviewed healthcare executives across eight
different healthcare organizations nationally recognized for their successful
implementation of HIT, he found the establishment of a clear organizational vision
supported by a strong, persistent, committed, and determined leadership team to be
essential to the success of any HIT implementation. Moreover, Loppnow found the
strategic integration of operational and IT goals, and the ability of the leadership team to
situate new technologies as enabling tools in the delivery of patient care, to be critical
success factors. These findings are consistent with current change leadership literature.
Both Kotter (1996) and Atchison (1999) stress the importance of aligning organizational
values and goals, developing a well-crafted organizational vision, and assembling a
strong guiding coalition to communicate the vision and lead the change process.
Project management. In a survey of 77 healthcare executives, project
management was identified as the most important HIT knowledge area (Lang, 2003).
Similarly, audits conducted by executives at ten different healthcare organizations to
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determine how well seven major executive management principles were carried out
revealed that the “employment of effective project management in system development”
(p. 231) received the highest mean score (Austin, Hornberger, Shmerling, & Elliott,
2000). The “organizations studied [understood] the importance of well-structured project
management teams for the implementation of individual information systems” (p. 236).
That is, in addition to supportive leadership, HIT implementations demand a structured
approach to project management if they are to be successful. IT managers must establish
and monitor realistic project goals that consider budget constraints, scheduling, and
quality, and must also ensure accountability by assigning specific tasks and deadlines to
each member of the project team (Bernstein et al., 2007).
Conceding a poor project management success rate, the IT department at the Los
Angeles County Department of Mental Health completed a project management training
program and adopted a five phase management methodology prior to embarking on a
series of projects including the implementation of a medical professional credentialing
system (Damaré, 2008). As they moved into the project execution phase, the
organization’s chief information officer commented:
Our training provided a clear starting point on how to elicit requirements, then
how to staff and build a project plan and clearly define who does what.
Considering we were severely understaffed at the start of the project, so far, we
have kept it on schedule and within budget. (p. 49)
Similarly, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services recognized the value
of a structured methodology and developed a lifecycle framework in 2004 to support IT
implementation projects (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2010). “A
carefully defined project outcome, appropriate project governance structure, and
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rigorous adherence to a structured systems development methodology are particularly
critical management tools for assuring return on investment” (Freed, 2006, p. 26).
Implementation. Implementation is defined by Bernstein et al. as an “essential
component of project management. . . . [that] involves the actual production and
performance assessment phases of integrating new systems and processes” (2007, p. 21).
As with project management, the implementation process should be structured. All new
technologies should “undergo preliminary testing in the context of the workplace” to
ensure compatibility with existing systems (Bernstein et al., 2007, p. 23).
Sallas et al. (2007) completed a case study involving the pilot implementation of
a handheld medication administration device and found that the utilization of a contextaware iterative assessment approach informed the ongoing implementation process by
allowing IT managers to evaluate the impact of the device on patient outcomes and
provider workflows. In contrast, organizations that fail to adequately test new
technologies risk implementation failure. In a qualitative study based on semi-structured
interviews examining the halted implementation of an electronic medical record system
at Kaiser Permanente Hawaii, twenty three individuals reported substantial system
design problems that may have been avoided with early testing (Scott, Rundall, Vogt, &
Hsu, 2005).
End user involvement. Bernstein et al. suggest that organizations should “foster
end user involvement throughout the entire scope of the integration process because the
end users are the individuals who will be using the new technology to perform their job”
(2007, p. 23). Without end user involvement, the project team runs the risk of
overlooking critical workflow elements and usability issues (Thielst, 2007a; Valerius,
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2007). Moreover, end user involvement leads to greater understanding of the need for
change, and a shared commitment to the goals of the project and the vision of the
organization (Jensen & Aanestad, 2007).
The involvement of physicians, nurses, and other stakeholders emerged as a
major success factor when Loppnow (2007) interviewed healthcare executives across
eight different healthcare organizations nationally recognized for their successful
implementation of HIT. Loppnow found that organizations commonly formed a clinical
informatics committee consisting of representative physicians, nurses, ancillary staff,
and operations personnel to provide input into the implementation design process.
Similarly, a study of ten different healthcare organizations found that most of the
organizations employed a user-driven implementation approach where end users served
as members of decision-making committees and project development teams (Austin et
al., 2000).
Kotter’s Eight-Step Change Model
As alluded to throughout this chapter, HIT implementation is, at its core, an
organizational change leadership and management challenge. Though there are
numerous organizational change models described in the literature, Kotter’s (1996)
eight-step process for leading organizational change is perhaps one of the more widely
recognized.
Step one: establishing a sense of urgency. A common error made by senior
management is to push forward with a change effort without first establishing a sense of
urgency within the organization (Kotter, 1996). Simply mandating a change is not
sufficient. According to Kotter, if senior management does not clearly communicate and
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illustrate the urgency of the issue or problem at hand, the organization will see little
reason to support the change effort. “The likelihood that the new behaviors and desired
routines will be valued and adopted is higher when the target group acknowledges the
need for change” (Seijts, 2006, p. 180). Too much organizational complacency, as Kotter
(1996) terms it, leads to resistance and ultimately, a failed change effort.
Step two: creating the guiding coalition. Another common error made by
organizations is to “conclude that the kind of leadership that is so critical to any change
can come only from a single larger-that-life person” (Kotter, 1996, p. 51). Kotter
suggests that “a strong guiding coalition is always needed – one with the right
composition, level of trust, and shared objective” (p. 52). While individuals generally do
not possess all the characteristics necessary to successfully lead a change effort, the right
team of individuals will collectively possess the necessary characteristics and power
required. This is not to say, however, that change efforts require no leader. Rather,
organizations should identify an internal champion, someone other than the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), to “handle the day-to-day details and work with the guiding
coalition to stay on target for periodic measurable achievements” (Atchison, 1999, p.
25).
Step three: developing a vision and strategy. According to Kotter (1996), a good
vision is essential for three reasons. First, a good vision simplifies a complex change
project by clearly stating the direction of the change. Second, it motivates the
organization to act in the desired direction, despite the challenges and inconveniences
the desired direction might present at first. Third, a good vision quickly and efficiently
helps to coordinate the actions of many. “Vision refers to a picture of the future with
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some implicit or explicit commentary on why people should strive to create that future”
(p. 68) and “strategy provides both a logic and a first level of details to show how a
vision can be accomplished” (p. 75).
Step four: communicating the change vision. “The real power of a vision is
unleashed only when most of those involved in an enterprise or activity have a common
understanding of its goals and direction. That shared sense of a desirable future can help
motivate and coordinate the kinds of actions that create transformations” (Kotter, 1996,
p. 85). In order to effectively communicate the change vision, Kotter (1996) suggests
that communications be presented using simple and concise language that is free of any
esoteric or technical jargon. Communications should make use of metaphors, analogies,
or examples where appropriate. Kotter also recommends the use of multiple
communication channels and repetition.
Step five: empowering employees for broad-based action. “Major internal
transformation rarely happens unless many people assist. Yet employees generally won’t
help, or can’t help, if they feel relatively powerless. . . . The purpose of stage five is to
empower a broad base of people to take action by removing as many barriers to the
implementation of the change vision as possible” (Kotter, 1996, p. 102). Barriers often
manifest themselves as organizational structures, systems, or management styles that are
not aligned with the change vision. If a change requires employees to master a new skill
set, acquisition of that skill set can become a barrier as well if left unaddressed.
Step six: generating short-term wins. According to Kotter (1996), short-term
wins are important for several reasons. First, they help justify the short-term costs of the
change effort. They also boost morale and motivation. Short-term wins provide tangible
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data that reinforce the change vision and demonstrate for senior management that the
change effort is on track. They stand in the face of resistors. Finally, short-term wins
help pick up the momentum; spectators become active participants in the change effort.
Step seven: consolidating gains and producing more change. Kotter extends the
following warning: “Whenever you let up before the job is done, critical momentum can
be lost and regression may follow” (1996, p. 133).
Step eight: anchoring new approaches in the culture. “Anchoring a new set of
practice in a culture is difficult enough when those approaches are consistent with the
core of the culture. When they aren’t, the challenge can be much greater” (Kotter, 1996,
p. 154).
Kotter’s Model in Action
Numerous organizations have successfully led change using Kotter’s (1996)
eight-step model. Kotter’s own internet site presents several case studies (Kotter
International, n.d.). Red Robin, the national restaurant chain, successfully reduced the
time needed for its new restaurants to normalize – achieve normal rates of return,
profitability and productivity – from three years to four months using Kotter’s model.
Similarly, Norfolk Southern successfully improved its safety and operations standards,
reducing its number of workplace injuries by 97%, using Kotter’s model.
A third case study presented on Kotter’s internet site, and also published
independently, concerns Centrelink, a service delivery agency for the Australian
Government established in 1997. Centrelink “underwent extensive change, seeking to
build a management capacity by positioning itself and interacting with organizations in
its complex environment, and aligning management systems in support of its objectives”
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(Halligan, 2008, p. 1). Kotter’s eight-step model played a significant role in the approach
undertaken by the organization’s CEO, Sue Vardon.
Vardon chose this model for the Centrelink transition on the basis of its
comprehensiveness and applicability. The model was almost tailor made for the
Centrelink transition and beyond, and Vardon used it to great effect. It contained
highly relevant guidelines for a CEO faced with the external and internal
environments of a public service agency in transition. (p. 70)
Vardon developed a vision and assembled a guiding coalition to lead the change.
The guiding coalition instituted “short-term cycles of action and reflection by
accelerating the pace of change and applying their combined business experience and
judgment to problems as a team” (Halligan, 2008, p. 73). The coalition reinforced the
vision, removed barriers, created opportunities for short-term wins, and helped anchor
new approaches in the organizational culture. “As a consequence, the organization was
able to claim that, in time, it became more customer centered, service delivery
conscious, client oriented and performance focused” (p. 81).
A fourth case study, presented by Hayes and Richardson (2008), illustrates
several shortcomings of Kotter’s model. The case study concerns Rhythm, a software
development company in Dublin that transitioned to a new software development
process known as Scrum. According to Hayes and Richardson (2008),
the steps outlined by Kotter were beneficial when implementing the Scrum
process at Rhythm. However, there were aspects relating to agile development
and software engineering in general that were either overlooked or not given
enough consideration. Likewise, there were elements of the framework that were
unnecessary or did not warrant as much attention as Kotter advised. (p. 169)
Kotter’s model assumes a top-down approach, whereas “at Rhythm, the change
project was introduced by middle management. As a result, one of the first steps
conducted in the change project required gaining the support and approval of senior and
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corporate management teams” (Hayes & Richardson, 2008, p. 169). Additionally,
Kotter’s model does not call for a pilot project, an undertaking “that worked extremely
well for Rhythm as it helped to eliminate stress and apprehension and allowed the team
to become self-organized, self-managed and self-directing” (p. 169). On the other hand,
Kotter’s steps concerning the development of a vision, the communication of that vision,
and the generation of short-term wins, all worked well for Rhythm.
Following Kotter’s model was a beneficial starting point for implementing a
change project and although it wasn’t entirely suitable; its use prevented the
Rhythm team in Dublin from making some of the customary mistakes that
organizations often make during change projects. Without using Kotter’s model,
the organization may have faced difficulty in implementing agile development.
(p. 169)
Summary
Despite the numerous benefits of HIT, healthcare organizations are slow to
adopt. Adoption barriers include the cost of implementation and maintenance, the
difficulty in defining return on investment, and physician resistance. Success factors, as
perceived by healthcare executives and industry experts, include the allocation of an
appropriately sized budget, consistently supportive leadership, structured project
management, adequate implementation testing, and end user involvement.
While success factors as perceived by healthcare executives and industry experts
are fairly well understood, success factors as perceived by HIT end users are not well
defined in the literature. This study sought the perspective of the HIT end user in
answering the question: How is HIT successfully implemented? Due to the subjective
nature of this research question, the study adopted a qualitative approach. In defining
qualitative research, Creswell (2003) wrote:
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Individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work. They
develop subjective meanings of their experiences – meanings directed toward
certain objects or things. These meanings are varied and multiple, leading the
researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings
into a few categories or ideas. The goal of the research, then, is to rely as much
as possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied. (p. 8)
Therefore, this study attempted to qualitatively describe the strategies, actions,
and other factors that contribute to the successful implementation of HIT as perceived by
HIT end users.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Introduction
Despite the wide recognition of health information technology (HIT) as a key
enabler in the quest to improve the quality of healthcare, the United States continues to
lag behind other countries in its adoption of HIT (Chin, 2004; Jha et al., 2009; Schoen et
al., 2006). The recently passed American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
allocates over 20 billion dollars “to aid in the development of a robust IT infrastructure
for healthcare and to assist providers and other entities in adopting and using health IT”
(Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, 2009, p. 1), however,
funding and incentives alone will not necessarily lead to successful implementations and
increased HIT adoption (Goldstein & Zhang, 2009).
HIT implementation success factors as perceived by healthcare executives and
industry experts are well documented in the literature. Few studies, however, have
focused on the perceptions of HIT end users such as physicians and nurses (Jensen &
Aanestad, 2007). The purpose of this exploratory case study was to describe the
strategies, actions, and other factors that contribute to the successful implementation of
HIT as perceived by HIT end users. That is, this study sought the perspective of the HIT
end user in answering the question: How is HIT successfully implemented?
Following the organizational structure suggested by Roberts (2004), this chapter
presents the research methodology that guided this study. The first section introduces
and describes the rationale for the proposed research design. This is followed by a
description of the data sources, sampling procedures, and instrumentation used. The data
collection and analysis procedures are discussed next, followed by a discussion of
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protective measures related to the participation of human subjects. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the study’s methodological limitations.
Research Design
The case study research methodology was used to describe the strategies, actions,
and other factors that contribute to the successful implementation of HIT as perceived by
HIT end users. This method was used because the investigator sought to explain how an
organizational process worked (Yin, 2009). Moreover, the investigator had “clearly
identifiable cases with boundaries and . . . [sought] to provide an in-depth understanding
of the cases” (Creswell, 2007, p. 74).
The organizational process explored in this study was HIT implementation. The
specific cases explored included an April 2008 HIT implementation at an adult hospital,
hereafter referred to as Hospital A, and a September 2008 HIT implementation at a
children’s hospital, hereafter referred to as Hospital B. Several factors led to the
selection of these two cases: (a) both implementation events occurred relatively recently;
(b) both were convenience cases, that is, both hospitals represented populations that
could be conveniently sampled by the investigator (Creswell, 2007); and (c) an
exploration of two cases leading to a cross-case synthesis would likely generate richer
findings than a single-case analysis (Yin, 2009).
Data Sources
Hospital A is consistently ranked among the top hospitals in the nation by U.S.
News and World Report. Located in California, the 613-bed adult hospital supported
over 20,000 admissions and 40,000 emergency patient visits in 2008. In April of 2008,
Hospital A implemented a new inpatient electronic health record system developed by
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Epic Systems Corporation. Though the initial launch was not without its challenges, the
implementation was considered a success by the organization.
Hospital B, also located in California, is an internationally recognized children’s
hospital. In fiscal year 2008, the 272-bed hospital supported over 80,000 days of
inpatient care, 134,000 clinic visits, and 5,000 births. In September of 2005, the hospital
successfully implemented Cerner Corporation’s electronic health record system across
the majority of its inpatient units. In September of 2008, the Pediatric Intensive Care
Unit (PICU) at the hospital jumped onboard by implementing the Cerner system as well.
The April 2008 Epic implementation at Hospital A, and the September 2008
Cerner implementation in the PICU at Hospital B, constituted the two cases explored in
this study. As is typical with case study research, the investigator drew upon multiple
data sources to develop case descriptions and identify case-based themes (Creswell,
2007). Using multiple sources of data strengthened the construct validity of the study
(Yin, 2009). “Any case study finding or conclusion is likely to be more convincing and
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information, following a
corroboratory mode” (p. 116).
Primarily, the study drew upon interview data. The investigator expected guided
conversations with HIT end users at both hospitals to reveal important insights into the
recent HIT implementations. According to Yin (2009), interviews are an essential source
of evidence when dealing with human affairs or behavioral events. “Well-informed
interviewees can provide important insights into such affairs or events” (p. 108).
Factual details related to the HIT implementation events were culled from
secondary sources such as press releases, news articles, and internal presentations (Yin,
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2009). These sources were used as appropriate to help contextualize and corroborate the
interview data. Additionally, the investigator, an employee at Hospital A and a direct
participant in the 2008 Epic implementation, contributed observational data to the case
study. The participant-observation technique allowed the investigator to “perceive reality
from the viewpoint of someone ‘inside’ the case study rather than external to it” (p. 112).
Sampling Procedures
The target population at Hospital A included approximately 2,164 attending
physicians, 894 resident physicians, and 1,471 registered nurses. The target population at
the Hospital B PICU included approximately 23 attending physicians, seven critical care
fellows, and 75 registered nurses. The investigator employed several sampling strategies
to select interviewees from each respective population that could “purposefully inform
an understanding of the research problem” (Creswell, 2007, p. 125). The investigator
began by narrowing the sample based on several criteria (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Though numerous ancillary staff including technicians, therapists, and social workers
use HIT at both hospitals, the dominant HIT end users are physicians and nurses. Others
were less likely to contribute useful insights and were therefore excluded. The
investigator further narrowed the sample by excluding any individuals hired after the
respective implementation events. Individuals that did not personally experience the
implementation events were also less likely to contribute useful insights.
To ensure the selection of a sample that captured a proportional representation of
attending physicians, resident physicians, and nurses at each hospital, the investigator
stratified the respective populations by role. This stratified purposeful sampling strategy
allowed the investigator to look for differences between physician and nurse perceptions
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(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Physicians meeting the established sampling criteria were
identified with the assistance of the Office of Medical Staff Services. Nurses meeting the
established sampling criteria were identified with the assistance of the Chief Nurse
Scientist at each respective hospital.
The investigator employed a convenience sampling strategy to select specific
interviewees, that is, the investigator selected individuals consistent with the sampling
criteria from whom he could easily collect data (Creswell, 2007). To recruit physicians,
the investigator initially reached out to those with whom he was familiar. When unable
to identify a sufficient number of willing participants, invitations were sent to randomly
selected physicians. Nurses were recruited with the assistance of the Chief Nurse
Scientist and Nurse Managers at each respective hospital. All invitations to participate in
the study were sent via e-mail and included a description of the study’s purpose, the
estimated time commitment for the participant, the participant’s rights, and an assurance
of confidentiality.
While quantitative sampling logic and the typical criteria regarding sample size
do not apply to qualitative research (Yin, 2009), the investigator recognized that the
certainty of the captured understanding would grow with the sample size. To obtain a
maximally clear understanding of the cases, the investigator conducted as many
interviews as required until “successive interviews/observations . . . both formed the
basis for the creation of a category and confirmed its importance” (p. 330), thereby
achieving theoretical saturation (Bryman & Bell, 2003).
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Instrumentation
Qualitative research typically employs a loosely structured approach to
interviewing (Bryman & Bell, 2003). “Interviewers can depart significantly from any
schedule or guide that is being used” (p. 342). Nevertheless, Creswell (2007) suggests
that investigators develop and use an interview protocol including approximately five
open-ended questions. Therefore, the investigator conducted interviews using a semistructured interview guide. As is consistent with an in-depth case study interview,
interviewees were prompted to offer both factual details as well as their opinions
regarding the implementation events (Yin, 2009). The investigator invited each
interviewee “to propose her or his own insights into certain occurrences and . . . [used]
such propositions as the basis for further inquiry” (p. 107).
The initial interview questions (see Table 1) aimed to represent a narrowing of
the central research question (Creswell, 2007). The questions were developed with
Kvale’s (1996) nine question types in mind, and written in such a way as to allow
interviewees a fair amount of freedom in how they could respond. According to Bryman
and Bell (2003), leading questions should be avoided and “the formulation of the
research question(s) should not be so specific that alternative avenues of enquiry that
might arise during collection of fieldwork data are closed off” (p. 348).
As suggested by Yin (2009), the interview questions were further refined through
pilot testing. The investigator conducted a mock interview with the assistance of two
colleagues. The first colleague, a physician, served as the interviewee. The second
colleague served as an observer and took notes. The colleagues provided feedback
regarding the clarity and appropriateness of the questions asked, and more generally, the

31
investigator’s interviewing skills. As a result, the interview questions were revised (see
Table 2) to avoid leading the participant, ensure ease of comprehension, and maximize
the quality of data collected.
Table 1
Initial Interview Guide
Question Type

Question

Introducing

Please tell me about your experience with the HIT
implementation that took place in 2008.

Follow-up

To what extent were you involved in any of the implementation
activities, for example the planning, design, and/or "Go-Live"
support activities?

Indirect

To what extent were your colleagues (and other end users)
involved in any of the implementation activities?

Follow-up

What training did you receive?

Probing

How do you think the implementation went overall?

Follow-up

What do you believe went well?

Follow-up

What do you believe could have been done better?

Probing

What role did leadership personnel, including supervisors,
managers, directors, and executive administrators, play during
the implementation project?

Probing

How well was the organization’s goal communicated to you?

Direct

In what way(s) has the new system impacted the overall quality
of patient care you are able to provide?

Follow-up

Can you share some specific examples?

Direct

What do you believe should be done differently the next time the
organization engages in an HIT implementation project?
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Table 2
Revised Interview Guide
Question Type

Question

Introducing

Please tell me about your experience with the transition to
Epic/Cerner that took place in 2008.

Follow-up

To what extent were you involved in any of the implementation
activities, for example the planning, design, testing, and/or "GoLive" support activities?

Probing

How do you think the implementation went overall?

Follow-up

What do you believe was done well?

Follow-up

What do you believe could have been done better or differently?

Follow-up

What training did you receive and what did you think of it?

Probing

Can you describe how the organization’s goal was
communicated to you?

Probing

Can you describe how the organization’s leadership team
managed the transition?

Direct

In what way(s) has the new system impacted (positive or
negative) the overall quality of patient care you are able to
provide?

Direct

Would you characterize the implementation as “successful”?
Why or why not?

Follow-up

How do you define “successful”?

Probing

What do you believe needs to be done to ensure 100% success
the next time the organization engages in an HIT
implementation project?

Follow-up

Anything else you would like to add?
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Data Collection Procedures
The investigator used an interview protocol, that is, “a predesigned form used to
record information collected during an observation or interview” (Creswell, 2007, p.
135). The protocol (see Figure 1) included: (a) a section for recording demographic
information to be used to contextualize responses, (b) a prompt to review a description
of the study and the interviewee’s rights with the interviewee, (c) a prompt to review the
Information Sheet with the interviewee, (d) the interview questions, and (e) a prompt to
thank the interviewee and reiterate that the interviewee’s identity would be kept
confidential. As recommended by Creswell (2007), adequate recording procedures were
followed. A digital voice recorder was used to capture an audio recording of each
interview.
Document collection followed a less rigid protocol. As is consistent with case
study research, systematic searches for relevant documents occurred at the investigator’s
convenience (Yin, 2009). In addition to internet searches for publicly available
documents such as press releases and news articles, the investigator arranged access to
securely examine internal documents such as staff announcements, slide presentations,
and project plans. All documents, interview transcripts, and notes were stored in a
password-protected case study database such that both the investigator and other
authorized persons could easily retrieve them at a later time. As Yin (2009) suggests, “a
case study database markedly increases the reliability of the entire case study” (p. 119).
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Figure 1: The protocol followed during each interview.
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Data Analysis
The data analysis occurred in three phases consistent with the core elements of
qualitative data analysis (Creswell, 2007). To begin, the investigator reviewed the
documents, observations, and interview transcripts in the case study database to identify
major organizing ideas. This coding phase involved “reducing the data into meaningful
segments and assigning names for the segments” (p. 148). As suggested by Creswell,
these code names represented information that the investigator expected to find,
surprising information, or conceptually interesting or unusual information. Initially,
codes were noted on document and transcript margins. Upon a second pass, codes were
transferred to an electronic spreadsheet to facilitate further analysis.
Following the coding phase, the investigator identified patterns and combined
codes into broader categories or themes. Throughout this classification phase, the
investigator looked for multiple sources of evidence to support each emerging category
and noted any evidence of multiple perspectives within a given category (Stake, 1995).
Using the constant comparative method developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), the
investigator attempted “to ‘saturate’ the categories – to look for instances that
[represented] the category and to continue looking (and interviewing) until the new
information obtained [did] not further provide insight into the category” (Creswell, 2007,
p. 160).
In the final phase, the investigator completed a cross-case synthesis. The crosscase synthesis treated each case as a separate study (Yin, 2009). The investigator created
an electronic spreadsheet that displayed the data from the individual cases by category.
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The investigator then examined each table for cross-case patterns which illuminated
similarities and differences between the cases.
To ensure that the final account of each case was internally valid, the investigator
employed several strategies. First, the investigator made use of multiple sources of data.
Through a process of triangulation, the investigator corroborated evidence from different
sources to identify categories (Creswell, 2007). Where multiple interviewees provided
similar responses to the same question, or where interview responses matched data
gleaned from case documents, categories were defined. To further ensure the internal
validity of the findings, the investigator solicited the assistance of a peer reviewer to
provide “an external check of the research process, much in the same spirit as inter-rater
reliability in quantitative research” (p. 208). The peer reviewer questioned the data
analysis methods employed by the investigator as well as his interpretations of the data
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A written account of these debriefing sessions was kept by the
peer reviewer and the investigator.
Human Subjects Protection
The investigator requested permission to recruit subjects at both hospitals in
September 2009. The Chief of the Medical Staff at each hospital granted permission to
interview physicians and directed the investigator to the Office of Medical Staff Services
to obtain a list of all medical staff. Similarly, the Chief Nursing Officer at each hospital
granted permission to interview nurses and directed the investigator to work with the
Chief Nurse Scientist to recruit subjects. Furthermore, the investigator’s research
proposal was approved by the hospitals’ Institutional Review Board on October 2, 2009
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and the Pepperdine University Institutional Review Board on December 16, 2009 (see
Appendix).
Each subject was interviewed privately by the investigator in a location and at a
time of the subject's choosing. Each subject was interviewed once only for
approximately 15 to 30 minutes. Subjects had the right to refuse to answer any question
and the right to refuse audio recording of the interview.
The investigator securely stored the recorded interviews on his passwordprotected laptop computer until transcribed. Once the transcriptions were completed, all
audio recordings were deleted. Names and any other information which could lead to the
personal identification of subjects were omitted from all notes and transcripts. Each
subject was assigned an identification code based on role and organization. For example,
the first nurse interviewed at Hospital B was identified as BRN-1 throughout the case
study database and all reported findings. The key to this code was kept as a separate file
on the investigator’s password-protected laptop computer. Subjects were informed that
their individual privacy would be maintained in all presented and published data
resulting from the study, and that collected data would be kept in a secure manner for
five years at which time the data would be destroyed.
The probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research
were of minimal risk, that is, they were not greater in and of themselves than those
ordinarily encountered in daily life. The potential risks associated with participation in
the study included feeling anxious, uncomfortable, bored, or fatigued during the
interview. In the event that a subject felt anxious or uncomfortable, the subject had the
right to refuse to answer any question and the right to discontinue participation. In the
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event that a subject felt bored or fatigued, the subject had the right to request a break and
the right to discontinue participation. The investigator could not and did not guarantee or
promise that subjects would receive any direct benefit from participation in the study.
Subjects were informed, however, that the benefit of their participation to the profession
may include a greater understanding of what is required to plan and execute a successful
health information technology implementation project.
Subjects were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they had
the right to discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to
which they were otherwise entitled. Their decision whether or not to participate in the
study did not affect their employment. If they decided to participate and found they were
not interested in completing the interview in its entirety, they had the right to discontinue
at any point without being questioned about their decision.
Limitations
"Qualitative researchers are interested not in prediction and control but in
understanding” (Pinnegar & Daynes, 2007, p. 4). The investigator aimed to understand
and provide an accurate account of each case. Moreover, the investigator aimed to
produce externally valid research by describing what could be learned from the case
exploration, particularly as it relates to the planning and execution of successful health
information technology implementations.
It should be noted, however, that “interviewees’ responses are subject to the
common problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation” (Yin, 2009,
p. 108). As is consistent with most exploratory case study research, the study findings
should not be generalized to other cases (Creswell, 2007). Any attempt to generalize the
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study findings to a broader theory must be tested through replication of the findings in
additional cases (Yin, 2009). Nevertheless, by understanding the experiences within a
single organization, lessons can be learned that could be of value to other organizations
embarking on similar change projects.
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Chapter Four: Results
Introduction
This exploratory case study sought to describe the strategies, actions, and other
factors that contribute to the successful implementation of health information technology
(HIT) as perceived by HIT end users. That is, this study sought the perspective of the
HIT end user in answering the question: How is HIT successfully implemented? Using
the case study methodology described in Chapter Three, the investigator interviewed
twenty-nine end users that experienced the April 2008 HIT implementation at Hospital
A, and seven end users that experienced the September 2008 HIT implementation in the
Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) at Hospital B. Table 3 provides a summary of the
interview participants including their respective hospitals, roles, departments, years of
experience in healthcare, and years of experience with HIT.
All interviews were conducted between January 15 and April 12 of 2010. Ten
interviews were conducted in the offices of the respective participants, eleven interviews
were conducted in the investigator’s office, fourteen interviews were conducted by
telephone, and one interview was conducted in a hospital sitting area. The interviews
ranged from 15 minutes to 30 minutes in length. The investigator took hand-written
notes during all interviews. With one exception, all interviews were also recorded using
a digital voice recorder and personally transcribed by the investigator. The transcripts,
along with the notes taken during the unrecorded interview, were then analyzed as
described in Chapter Three.

41

Table 3
Interview Participants
Years of Experiencea
Narrative ID

Hospital

Role

Department/Unit

AMD-1
AMD-2
AMD-3
AMD-4
AMD-5
AMD-6
AMD-7
AMD-8
AMD-9
AMD-10
AMD-11
AMD-12
AMD-13
AMD-14
AMD-15
AMD-16
AMD-17
AMD-18
ARN-1
ARN-2
ARN-3
ARN-4
ARN-5
ARN-6
ARN-7
ARN-8
ARN-9
ARN-10
ARN-11
BMD-1
BMD-2
BMD-3
BRN-1
BRN-2
BRN-3
BRN-4

A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B

Attending
Resident
Attending
Attending
Attending
Attending
Attending
Resident
Resident
Resident
Attending
Resident
Attending
Resident
Resident
Resident
Resident
Resident
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Attending
Attending
Fellow
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse
Nurse

Surgery
Surgery
Surgery
Psychiatry
Anesthesia
Obstetrics & Gynecology
Medicine
Surgery
Medicine
Medicine
Psychiatry
Medicine
Emergency Medicine
Surgery
Surgery
Medicine
Surgery
Psychiatry
Emergency
Neurology
Cardio Thoracic ICU
Ostomy and Wound Care
Endoscopy
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This chapter presents the findings from each of the two case studies. Each case
study description begins with a brief introduction to the case. This introduction is
followed by a summary of the themes that emerged during the analysis of the interview
data. The chapter concludes with a cross-case synthesis.
Hospital A
Hospital A is a 613-bed hospital supported by approximately 2,164 attending
physicians, 894 resident physicians, and 1,471 registered nurses. In April of 2008, the
hospital implemented a new inpatient electronic health record system developed by Epic
Systems Corporation. Though the initial launch was not without its challenges, the
implementation was considered a success by the organization. To develop this case study
description, the investigator reviewed several internal communications and
presentations, and interviewed eight attending physicians, ten resident physicians, and
eleven registered nurses. The investigator’s personal observations as a participant in the
implementation were also considered.
Preparation for the implementation began in late 2005. Various workgroups
composed of physicians, nurse managers, information technology analysts, and members
of the hospital administration were assembled to guide the implementation project and
make key decisions. The hospital adopted an implementation methodology prescribed by
Epic Systems Corporation which called for a series of Design, Build, and Validate
(DBV) sessions. A subset of nurses and physicians, designated as Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs), attended these DBV sessions. Together with information technology analysts
and consultants from Epic, the SMEs made decisions about how the system would need
to be customized. The necessary customizations were then built into the model system
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and validated. The DBV sessions ran roughly from October 2006 through May of 2007.
The DBV sessions were followed by several cycles of system testing and additional
system build.
End user training began in late November of 2007. Nurses received 16 hours of
classroom training over two days. Attending physicians received either two hours of
online training followed by six hours of classroom training, or five hours of online
training followed by three hours of classroom training, depending on their preference.
Resident physicians received two to six hours of online training depending on their
specialty.
Originally, the system was to be activated in late January of 2008. After several
adjustments to the activation schedule to accommodate additional testing and
preparation, the system was finally activated on April 25, 2008. Activation was followed
by four weeks of twenty-four-by-seven on-site support provided by information
technology staff and a team of Epic-experienced consultants contracted by the hospital.
For ease of identification, the on-site support team wore green and red shirts branded
with the hospital’s logo; green shirts supported the physicians and red shirts supported
nursing staff. In addition, a subset of nurses and physicians served as Super Users. These
Super Users underwent additional training prior to activation so that they could support
their colleagues. While nurse Super Users were released of their clinical duties and
considered out of the count for the first two weeks following activation, physician Super
Users saw patients and assisted colleagues concurrently. Five of the physicians and four
of the nurses interviewed by the investigator served as Super Users.
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All but one of the 29 interview participants characterized the implementation as
successful. The investigator found the participants’ definitions of success to be
particularly noteworthy. When asked if she would characterize the implementation as
successful, nurse ARN-1 responded: “Was it successful? Yes I would say it was in a
way. I mean we implemented it and people started using it. No one died. Usually that’s
the key thing”. Thirteen other participants responded similarly, that is, from their
perspective, the implementation was successful because it did not cause any adverse
events and it did not generate a revolt.
Analyzed further, however, a multi-dimensional definition of success began to
emerge. Surgical resident AMD-15 had the following to say:
Patient care didn’t grind to a halt, so in that respect it was a success. And there
weren’t mass revolts or people refusing to use it. Did it make me go out and want
to recommend [Epic] to other people, no, I don’t think it was that successful.
Indeed, over half of the participants stated that the implementation could have
gone better. Participants AMD-1, AMD-2, and ARN-10 stated that they do not believe
the system has improved patient care. ARN-6 stated that the impact of the system on
patient care is neutral at best. AMD-14, AMD-17, and ARN-8 stated that the
implementation was a step in the right direction, but they also noted that there is room
for improvement in terms of the usability of the system and how efficiently the system is
used by different areas of the hospital. And AMD-3 and ARN-6 thought that the
implementation was successful overall, but they cautioned that the current system does
not function efficiently for all areas of the hospital.
Further analysis of the interview data led to the emergence of six themes which
suggest factors that allow or inhibit HIT implementation success.
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On-site support. The interview participants almost uniformly identified the
presence of on-site support during the initial weeks as a critical success factor.
Psychiatry attending AMD-4 recalled “that there was no impediment to asking for help”
because there was so much on-site support available. For surgical resident AMD-8, onsite support “was the right way to spend the resources. It was good to have people
walking around in a green or red shirt and that would be the person to go to for help”.
Medicine resident AMD-10 agreed with his colleague, stating that “the one thing that
really succeeded in the transition was having on-site support. The green shirts were
hugely successful in helping with the transition”. Psychiatry attending AMD-11 “thought
it was pretty cleverly handled by the administration” to have people “on the unit wearing
different colored shirts to help [end users] learn the system”. Medicine resident AMD-12
stated that “the best thing was having support staff everywhere”. And for Surgical
resident AMD-14, having a
huge cadre of support staff at your beck and call for two weeks straight to
troubleshoot . . . made it as smooth a transition as I could imagine. . . . And they
had a lot of residents and physicians from other places where Epic was
implemented as part of the support team. There are some things that you can only
talk about with another medical person in terms of figuring things out, so that
was good. . . . I think the two weeks of support was critical.
ARN-2 attributed the success of the implementation to the Super Users, stating
that “they were able to help with the ongoing questions” and that “it was a good idea to
invest in them”. Similarly, ARN-6 stated having the Super Users around all the time was
a good thing, and “the red shirts helped too”. For ARN-9, the Super Users were critical:
The Super Users were prepared very well so they could help us out well. And
they kept us really updated, when they were going to roll it out, what the troubles
were, and so we were never surprised by it.
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ARN-8 echoed his colleagues, stating that “the fact that there was so much
support after the launch” made the success possible. Similarly, ARN-1, ARN-5, and
ARN-10 attributed the success of the implementation to the on-site support. The study
investigator witnessed first-hand the need and appreciation for on-site support personnel
while serving on the on-site support team. End users kept him busy during each of his
support shifts and never failed to express their gratitude for his assistance.
System usability. System usability issues were a dominant theme throughout most
of the interviews. Ten physicians and four nurses described the system as either userunfriendly or unintuitive. Eleven physicians and four nurses described the searching and
filtering capabilities of the system as inadequate. Nurse ARN-8 stated that while
There is so much information being poured into it, there is no real facility for
searching and finding what you want. . . . It’s the twenty-first century. We should
be able to search the data. We should be able to sort the data. We should be able
to filter any way we want.
Surgical resident AMD-14 echoed this concern, noting that “there are so many
obvious ways that you could improve it in terms of searching for stuff and organizing
things that it’s a shame they don’t do it”. AMD-4, AMD-8, and AMD-14 stated that the
system should allow for greater personalization, and AMD-3, AMD-5, and S10 noted
that correcting data entry errors is very difficult.
Seven participants stated dissatisfaction with the system’s ability to meet the
specific needs of a protocol, their workflow or their unit. Medicine resident AMD-9
stated that “in terms of physician workflow, things are clearly missing” and psychiatry
attending AMD-11 noted that “for people that are doing a lot of medication management
. . . it’s not a terribly helpful system. . . . In general, none of these systems are set up for
psychiatry”. Emergency Medicine attending AMD-13 stated that
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It really needs to be a separate system for the ED that integrates with the hospital
system and not a hospital system that you try to tweak to make work for the ED
because our practice pattern does not fit any other practice pattern.
Similarly, Cardiac Care Unit nurse ARN-6 stated that the system does not work
well for a critical care environment and Endoscopy nurse ARN-5 noted that her unit has
specific needs which the system does not support in a way that flows easily.
Four of the eleven nurses interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the system’s
interface for documenting care plans. ARN-9 described the care plans as “a little
unwieldy” and difficult to modify and individualize. Both ARN-7 and ARN-8 noted that
the inefficient design results in double-charting. ARN-7 recalled:
They kept on saying how easy care planning was going to be, you just make a
few clicks and you have your care plan. . . . It’s not individualized enough.
People just click on things willy-nilly that don’t actually pertain to the patient
condition. The care plan doesn’t actually drive care. . . . Information doesn’t flow
from the documentation flowsheet to the care plan or visa versa. Like
documenting in the flowsheet that we’re suctioning [the patient] every two hours,
you have to separately go into the care plan to say that you’ve cleared the airway
every hour and click that the goal met this shift.
Seven physicians and one nurse stated that the system seems to be designed for
billers and coders, not clinicians. As surgical resident AMD-15 summarized:
It’s certainly not very easy to use, and it’s frustrating that it seems to be designed
from the perspective of the financial people or the bean counters or whatever,
and not really in terms of the clinical people that take care of patients, write
orders, and have to use this thing to get patients what they need.
End user frustration with the usability of the system was personally observed by
the study investigator while he served on the on-site support team. He assisted a
countless number of end users that had unsuccessfully attempted to navigate the system
to locate the information they required.
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Physician documentation. Another significant theme centered around the
system’s impact on the quality of physician documentation. Nine of the eighteen
physicians interviewed reported that the implementation adversely affected the quality of
physician documentation. Prior to the implementation, progress notes were dictated.
Notes are now typed directly into the system, a task which is far more time-consuming
in comparison to dictation. As surgical attending AMD-3 explained:
Some of us are good typists and others of us are not. If you’re not a good typist,
then you don’t really want to say much in your note and so you end up letting
certain things slide. . . . I think you end up communicated less well.
Moreover, the system-generated templates appear to do more harm than good.
Medicine resident AMD-9 stated that “so many things are pre-populated, that the notes
contain irrelevant information, making the note really long and obstructing the important
information”. Medicine attending AMD-7 echoed the resident, adding that
There’s a lot of copying that happens and a lot of it isn’t relevant data. I don’t
think people are going through to read it as carefully as one should when copying
and it’s just a matter of how much time people have when writing the notes.
Medicine resident AMD-12 stated that some physicians are abusing the copy and
paste functionality, therefore generating “notes that are not reflecting at all what’s
happening from day to day”. Surgical resident AMD-15 concurred:
Our progress notes aren’t as good, less concise and less useful to other people,
even to ourselves, because template-driven progress notes include a lot of
garbage. . . . So notes become longer but contain less information and are less
readable.
Shortly after activation, while serving on the on-site support team, the study
investigator assisted a physician dealing with this very problem. The physician wanted to
insert a specific set of lab results into his progress note. The system, however, only
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allowed him to insert a generic summary of recent lab results containing additional data
irrelevant to the focus of the progress note.
Nursing workflow. The system’s impact on the nursing workflow also emerged
as a significant theme. Nine of the eleven nurses interviewed reported that the increased
charting requirements as a result of the implementation are pulling them away from
patient care. According to ARN-2, “there’s a lot of charting now. There’s at least two
and a half hours of charting for every eight hour shift, and that takes away from patient
care”. ARN-3 concurred:
Just because the system can do something doesn’t mean we should be doing
something with it. They keep adding more and more and more things for us to
chart, to the point where it pulls us farther and farther away from the patient. . . .
These are new things that we didn’t chart before Epic, like care plans we were
charting every 24 hours and all of the sudden we need to do it every 12 hours.
Nurse ARN-11 reported going from spending about five to ten percent of her
time charting to roughly 40 percent of her time charting. Nurse ARN-3 shared:
Relatives and patients in the ICU, when I used to work there, they would tell me
that we spend more time with the computers now than with the patients. I have to
agree with that. It does take you away from patient care a bit. Charting is more
labor intensive.
Nurse AMD-5 stated that now nurses “focus 80 percent of their time on their
computer and less time with their patients. . . . [Their] main focus now seems to be
worrying about the charting”. Nurse ARN-7 was particularly vocal about this issue,
recalling a recent visit by a Joint Commission surveyor:
The surveyor actually came out, and I was there, this is not hearsay, and out of
her mouth said “this system gets in the way of patient care”. . . . The reason I’m
so upset about it is that some of us at the bedside and managers have been saying
this over and over to no avail and it’s very frustrating. . . . [Administrators] need
to examine that more closely. And examine what they want nurses to be. Do they
want nurses to be [loggers] of information, or do they want them – I mean it’s not
either or, we have to have documentation, but the emphasis has to be patient care.
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Training. Another dominant theme centered on dissatisfaction with the end user
system training. Eight participants found the training to be boring, too long, or simply
not helpful. Seven participants stated that the training came too far ahead of activation –
by the time the system was activated, several months later than originally planned, they
had forgotten what they had learned. Indeed, the organization’s decision to delay the
activation of the system occurred well after end user training had begun. While
providing on-site support, the study investigator observed that many end users, as a
result of the delay, had not retained what they had been taught during their classroom
training.
Six participants stated that the training did not adequately address the needs of
their specialty or specific workflow. Fourteen participants found that the training, while
useful as an introduction, did not fully prepare them to work with the new system.
Anesthesia attending AMD-5
found it very unhelpful because it related to a lot of things you would do on the
floor. I think if I were an internist it would have been more useful. . . . And by
the time it was actually implemented, the training had been so far in advance that
I really had to learn on the job. . . . They can tell you how to log in and how to
open things, and you kind of remember that stuff, but then you actually learn
how to use it by using it.
For surgical resident SMD 8, the training “was good for the general issues . . .
but for the most part, for the nitty-gritty, [he] just [liked] trying it and being able to ask
for help”. According to medicine resident AMD-9, “you can’t learn everything in a
couple-hour lecture; you need to be actually doing it in real-time in order for it to stick”.
Medicine resident AMD-12 agreed with his colleague:
Clearly a lot of work was put into [the online tutorial] but the end utility to the
user was minimal. . . . I think beyond a very modest degree of making you

51
familiar with how the screens work. . . . I think all medicine residents would say
that they really learned by just troubleshooting as they used the live system for
the first time. I think that before going live and using it on actual patients, people
had little to no practical training.
Several of the nurses interviewed made similar statements. For ARN-1, the
training “was very generic” and “should have been tailored to the actual workflow”. For
ARN-2, “training on the computers and practicing practical things without the patient . .
. [did not] translate at all. Once [nurses] are on the unit with patients, it’s a lot different”.
And for ARN-8, the depth of the training was insufficient:
There wasn’t enough of it. It didn’t go deep enough. . . . It was more like recipes.
. . . “In order to document this, go here”. In order to document that, zap, you go
to a completely different place. And so, there is no cohesiveness that is apparent
until you start to use the software for a length of time.
Six participants stated that they would have preferred a phased approach to
training or some other form of follow-up. As ARN-10 explained:
I don’t think there was enough follow-up afterwards. . . . Our suggestion at one
point was that people have a formal class maybe six months after go-live, after
they’ve been charting for awhile, so that they can then know enough to ask
questions on stuff that they didn’t absorb enough to even know how to ask
questions on.
Similarly, attending physician AMD-13 stated that “the initial training was
adequate, but . . . there was no follow-up training”. He would have preferred “training,
real world practice, and then more training potentially to answer any questions and
optimize” his usage of the system.
Implementation goals. Another theme identified by the investigator centered on
the participants’ understanding of the implementation goals. Specifically, thirteen
physicians and three nurses saw the implementation as inevitable; the organization was
simply keeping up with the times. AMD-3 stated that “part of it is that we have to do it
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because that’s the move the country is making for healthcare, period”. AMD-4 got the
sense that the organization was “going to the twenty-first century and this was what [it
was] supposed to do”. AMD-5 asked “It’s inevitable isn’t it? If you haven’t got one you
better get one soon”. AMD-6 stated that “if you work in medicine, you know what the
goals are. . . . The goals are very straight forward”. AMD-7 stated that “it’s pretty
obvious that in this day in age you can’t have a major medical center without an EMR”.
For AMD-8, it’s “just one of those things that at the end of the day you knew it had to be
done sometime”.
AMD-10 “saw that the nation needed to go this way. . . . It really didn’t need to
be explained”. AMD-11 “figured everyone’s doing it” and AMD-12 thought the goal
“was relatively self-evident”. AMD-13 stated that the staff “all understand that all the
records are going to transition that way”. AMD-14 stated that the organization’s goal
“was sort of implicit” and “almost self-apparent” and AMD-17 understood “that at some
point all hospitals are going to be required to have EMRs”. AMD-18 stated that it’s “the
future of medicine and the direction we’re going in”. The message ARN-1 got was that
“a lot of hospitals are doing it and we should too” and ARN-4 stated that “there’s a big
push by the government to do this”. And lastly, ARN-10 stated that “everyone
understands that it’s the wave of the future. It’s not even future anymore, it’s now”.
Moreover, several participants stated their belief that the organization was
perhaps not entirely forthcoming about its goals. As AMD-15 explained:
[One goal] that nobody really talked about . . . and I think drives a lot of this is
billing and coding. I have some knowledge of how that stuff works and
subsequently, a lot of the workshops have been dealing with what words to use in
your medical records so that billers and coders can code efficiently, so we get
paid for hospitalizations, and so that our severity of illness looks appropriate, and
so that our outcomes will look appropriate for the case complexity we see.
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Similarly, AMD-3 felt the organization was not entirely forthcoming:
I guess for me personally, I would rather have the institution just tell me why
they’re doing it. If it’s business decision, it’s a business decision. I don’t want
them to sugarcoat it. . . . I think the hospital did this for billing reasons . . . . Most
of us are skeptical and don’t really believe what we’re told in these situations.
Based upon the study investigator’s personal observations while serving on the
implementation project team, the organization’s goals were far from transparent. He
gathered that the organization desired to make both quality and operational
improvements by establishing a single integrated hospital-wide clinical information
system. To his knowledge, however, specifics beyond this generalization were not
explicitly communicated.
Hospital B
Hospital B is a 272-bed hospital supported by approximately 835 medical staff
and 2,599 nursing, ancillary, support, and administrative staff. In September of 2005, the
hospital successfully implemented Cerner Corporation’s electronic health record system
across the majority of its inpatient units. Subsequent phases saw the system activated in
higher acuity units. In October of 2007, the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) began
using the system, and in September of 2008, the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU)
jumped onboard. The Cardiovascular Intensive Care Unit (CVICU) is expected to follow
suit in September of 2010.
This case study focused on the September 2008 implementation that occurred in
the PICU. The PICU is supported by approximately 23 attending physicians, 7 critical
care fellows, and 75 registered nurses, among other ancillary and support staff.
Additionally, 6 pediatric residents rotate through the unit on a monthly basis. To develop
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the case study description, the investigator reviewed several internal communications
and presentations, and interviewed two attending physicians, one fellow, and four
registered nurses.
Preparation for the implementation began in February of 2008. A workgroup
including PICU nurses, physicians, the unit manager, an information technology analyst,
and members of the Clinical Informatics Department was assembled to review the
system and identify customizations that would be required to support the
implementation. To familiarize staff with the key components of the system, a number of
brief sessions were delivered at the bedside and at the nurses’ station on the unit. Formal
training began in late July 2008. Nurses received 16 hours of training over two days.
Attending physicians and fellows received one hour of training.
The system was activated on September 7, 2008. Activation was followed by six
weeks of twenty-four-by-seven on-site support provided by Super Users – nurses and
physicians that had received additional training in order to support their colleagues. For
the initial week, there were five nurse Super Users out of the count providing support.
This number was reduced by one each week, with only one Super User out of the count
during weeks five and six. Several physicians from Cerner Corporation provided
physician support during rounds for two weeks, there was an extra resident on-site for
two weeks, and the Medical Director for Clinical Informatics rounded daily for three
weeks. Two of the interview participants, BMD-3 and BRN-4, served as Super Users.
The interview participants uniformly characterized the implementation as
successful. As with the previous case, the investigator found their definition of success
to be particularly noteworthy. Both attending physician BMD-2 and nurse BRN-2
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characterized the implementation as successful because patient care was not adversely
affected. BRN-2 characterized the implementation as successful because everybody
“was able to transition and actually use the charting system even though there were
people who believed they couldn’t do it or were very reluctant to”. Nurse BRN-1 echoed
this characterization, stating that “everybody is comfortable with it” and “using it”.
Analyzed further, however, a multi-dimensional definition of success began to
emerge. Attending physician BMD-1 shared that while the “data would suggest that
patient safety has been improved, [she is] not completely convinced of that”. Similarly,
BMD-2 found it hard to say if the system had improved patient care. While BRN-2
acknowledged that the system will allow for more efficiency in the long run, she also
noted that improvements are needed. Similarly, nurses BRN-3 and BRN-4 agreed that
while the implementation was successful in some areas, improvements are needed in
others.
Further analysis of the interview data led to the emergence of five themes which
suggest factors that allow or inhibit HIT implementation success.
On-site support. The interview participants almost uniformly identified the
presence of on-site support during the initial weeks as a critical success factor. For
attending physician BMD-1:
It was really helpful to have people in the unit that were from Cerner or that were
much more trained and adept in the system when it was implemented. . . .
Otherwise our workflow that day would have been a disaster. It would have
taken us so much longer to round. . . . It was good to have Super Users.
Fellow BMD-3 echoed her colleague, stating that the Super Users and other onsite support personnel were critical to the success of the implementation. She did note,
however, that while there was a lot of support for nursing staff, there was very little
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support for physicians. More physician support, she said, “could have made the
transition go even smoother”.
All four nurses interviewed by the investigator corroborated these findings.
BRN-1 thought the Super Users “really helped” and BRN-2 recalled that “there were a
lot of Super Users. . . . [It] was nice because we didn’t have to worry about having to sit
there and figure it out”. BRN-3 and BRN-4 were similarly pleased with the number of
Super Users and other on-site personnel. However, like BMD-3, BRN-4 felt that “the
doctors were left high and dry” and would have benefited from having as much support
as did the nurses. She recalled one day in particular when one of the resident physicians
sat at the computer for 14 hours and wrote orders because the attending physicians,
unable to enter the orders themselves, were offloading the responsibility onto the
resident.
System usability. System usability issues were a dominant theme throughout all
of the interviews. Attending physician BMD-1 described the system as “non-intuitive”,
noting that learning simple tasks, like setting up a patient list, require a five-minute
explanation. Attending physician BMD-2 stated that consult notes are not organized in
an intuitive way and the system does not facilitate the generation of daily progress notes.
Nurse BRN-3 recalled not being able open a patient’s chart in the system because
another provider was already using the chart. And nurse BRN-4 noted that the system
does not allow her to easily document that there has been no change in her patient’s
status over the last hour, leading to redundant charting which “can be quite arduous”.
Several participants spoke of the lack of “situational awareness” provided by the
system. Prior to the implementation, according to fellow BMD-3, providers relied on a
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paper flowsheet to “obtain a quick glimpse of the patient’s status throughout the day”.
The new system failed to provide this quick glimpse and “it was difficult for the fellows
and attendings to figure out where to get information”. As BMD-1 explained it:
Patients used to have flow-sheets that you could look at all the vital pieces of
information, . . . their vital signs, the specific continuous infusions, the
medications they’re on, ventilator support, certain important laboratory studies,
intake and output, and so on. So essentially I could pick up a piece of paper and
look at a trend of information I needed. That information is really difficult for me
to access.
BRN-3 corroborated this shortcoming of the system, stating that the information
needed to develop “the whole picture of what’s going on” can be challenging to find,
whereas “when [they] were on paper, [they] had giant flow-sheets and [they] could
visually see all the pieces of information”.
BMD-2 indicated that they are still working on a solution to the flowsheet
problem. According to BMD-3, they tried to implement iAware, an enhancement
provided by Cerner Corporation to address this issue, but it “came so much later that it
wasn’t very successful as people found workarounds to get info they needed”.
Nurse BRN-4 also saw the lack of an adequate “snapshot of what’s going on with
[the] patient” as a problem. While she acknowledged that the iAware solution was an
improvement, she also noted that narrative comments entered into the system by the
nurses do not appear on the flow-sheets that the physicians print out. According to BRN4:
That dialogue is very useful to doctors when they come to the bedside . . . and
pull open the flow-sheet. . . . Maybe it’s just the tactile feeling of being able to
see and understand what’s going on, and that the nurse felt was important enough
to actually write a note about.
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BRN-4 felt the system “was as nurse-friendly as it could be” when initially
implemented, but nevertheless, felt it changed “the entire culture of how [nurses] are
reporting and documenting”. Only after four to five months of use did she feel
comfortable working with the system. Nurse BRN-1 echoed these statements, explaining
that while everyone is now comfortable with the system, improvements are needed if the
system is to become more nurse-friendly.
Physician workflow. Another significant theme centered around the
implementation’s impact on the physician workflow. Prior to the implementation,
physicians regularly visited their patients’ bedsides to review the chart and write orders.
Now, post-implementation, chart review and order entry is typically done from a
computer located away from the bedside. Five of the seven participants reported that this
change in workflow adversely affects the relationship between physicians and their
patients, as well as communication between physicians and nurses.
Fellow BMD-3 stated that the “physicians go to the bedside less often because,
instead of going into the patient’s room, they go to the front desk to find a computer,
enter a bunch of orders”, after which they must “still remember to go to each nurse and
let them know what [they’ve] ordered. . . . It does impair some of the physician
interaction with nurses and patients”. Nurse BRN-3 corroborated this finding, stating
that there is “less communication between the physicians and the nurses as far as order
entry” and “even a problem with doctors putting in wrong orders on wrong patients
because they sit at a desk and just put in orders”. Nurse BRN-4 further elaborated on
this, explaining that previously, physicians would actually have to come into the room to
review the chart and write an order:
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They [couldn’t] be sitting at the desk and be removed from the patient looking at
values and labs and figures that come up on the computer, which is very
important and it’s useful to be able to do that in a satellite area, but if you’re
making decisions about the care of a patient on an hourly basis, you need to be
able to come to the bedside and look, because there are times that you might
draw a lab or have a figure that isn’t relevant to what’s really going on and you
have to understand the whole picture.
This account paralleled the account by attending physician BMD-1, who
explained that “very few times [does she] have to go to the patient’s bedside anymore.”
She gets all the information she needs from the computer and puts in the orders at the
computer. “So there’s much more limited actual examination of the patient and therefore
limited physician-patient interaction”. Moreover, she has started to notice that this new
workflow is impacting team dynamics, “because every single person on the team . . . [is]
looking at the computer screen all the time rather than being engaged in the discussion
that’s happening”.
This impact to the workflow appears to be exasperated by the fact that accessing
patient information and entering orders is more time-consuming than it was prior to
implementation, meaning less time spent at the bedside. For attending physician BMD-1:
The system is so incredibly slow, that it slows down our work rounds, and there
are so many constant reminders of things being outside the parameter, that
having to always justify something you’re doing outside of the parameter in
order to actually put your order in is very frustrating.
Attending physician BMD-2, who also cares for patients in the paper-based
Cardiovascular ICU, corroborated this finding when he stated that “it seems that the
overall workflow is faster with paper versus POE”. Similarly, BMD-3 noted that the
system “definitely slows physician workflow” and that “it would be really helpful if
physicians could enter orders by the bedside. It would facilitate frequent checking on the
patient and more interaction with nursing. The current setup does not allow this”.
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System selection. Concerns regarding the selection of the system and its
appropriateness for a critical care environment also emerged as a theme. Four of the
seven interview participants suggested that perhaps the Cerner system was not the best
choice for the PICU. Attending physician BMD-2 explained that in 2005:
The director of the ICU at the time and I spent a lot of time looking at software
and devices that would make life a lot easier in the ICU. I understood the
institution’s desire to have a system-wide solution, but I was looking at best of
breed and was very disappointed that we didn’t buy the ICU solution that we had
come to recommend.
Instead of selecting the solution best suited for the ICU and integrating that with
the solution best suited for the rest of the hospital, a decision was made to go with
Cerner hospital-wide. This decision, according to BMD-2, was made despite the fact that
“a lot of the stuff that Cerner had promised [them] for the ICU was not developed yet”.
Indeed, as discussed earlier, the iAware enhancement was not available at the time of
initial implementation, leaving the physicians and nurses without the situational
awareness previously provided by the paper flowsheet.
Several major issues at implementation seemed to support the idea that perhaps
Cerner was not the right choice. Fellow BMD-3 noted that “there were a couple pieces
of equipment that were specific to the PICU that were a little bit hard to figure out how
to integrate with CPOE”. Nurse BRN-3 recalled that when the system was initially
implemented, it often froze or simply shut off when a large number of infusions were
being charted or when she attempted to open an information-rich patient chart:
It doesn’t work well for critical care because the patients are sicker, there’s a lot
more information that needs to be charted more frequently. . . . There were all
these things that came up that really prohibited and effected patient care,
especially in the ICU – which is really all I can speak for – but a lot of the
explanations I got from other people were like “well it works on the general care
floors, it should work for you guys”.
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Though she acknowledged that recent upgrades have helped, nurse BRN-4
echoed her colleague’s concerns stating that “in the beginning it was very difficult to
chart on a sick patient because once you got a certain amount of information in the
computer it was really slow and difficult to upload”. Similarly, nurse BRN-2 noted that
the system can sometimes take a long time to load up a chronic patient’s chart because
the chart contains so much information. She stated that “if [the hospital] could decrease
the amount of delay that it can sometimes have with chronic patients, it would be better.
. . . [Hospital B] may need to look into better software”.
Implementation goals. Another dominant theme centered on the participants’
understanding of the implementation project goals. Attending physician BMD-1 could
not recall the goals ever being communicated. She suggested that perhaps “they thought
it was self-evident that the whole country is moving towards an EMR and so [Hospital
B] should do the same”. Similarly, nurse BRN-2 could not remember if the organization
had explicitly communicated the goals:
Oh, I don’t remember. Most people, well most of the hospitals are using
electronic charting. I think they probably want to be up-to-date with other
hospitals. . . . In the long run, I think they are hoping for better efficiency and
better patient care.
Like her colleague, nurse BRN-3 thought it was simply a reflection of the times.
“Pretty much every other hospital was on computerized charting except [Hospital B]”.
BRN-4 “understood that professionally it’s something that all hospitals should be
moving toward”. She could not recall hearing of any specific organizational goals, and
assumed “innovation in patient safety” was the primary goal. BMD-3 was the only
interview participant to applaud the organization’s efforts to “improve buy-in” by
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communicating the goals of the project, though she conceded only understanding pieces
of the overall vision at first. The more she got involved with the design of the system,
the better she understood the goals.
Cross-Case Synthesis
The hospital-wide HIT implementation at Hospital A directly impacted
approximately 2,164 attending physicians, 894 resident physicians, and 1,471 registered
nurses, among other ancillary and support staff. The HIT implementation at Hospital B,
on the other hand, was limited to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) and directly
impacted approximately 23 attending physicians, seven critical care fellows, and 75
registered nurses, among other ancillary and support staff.
Prior to the implementation at Hospital A, physician documentation was either
hand-written or dictated. However, the organization had already been using an HIT
system to facilitate electronic order entry and nursing documentation. Four interview
participants stated that the transition to the new system was “cushioned” by their
previous experience. The PICU at Hospital B, on the other hand, was completely paperbased prior to the implementation. The shift to electronic order entry and nursing
documentation – physician documentation remains paper-based – represented an entirely
new experience for many of the end users, including three of the nurses interviewed by
the investigator.
The HIT implementation cases explored in this study, though significantly
different in scope, shared some thematic similarities. In both cases, interview
participants almost uniformly identified the presence of on-site support during the initial
weeks as a critical success factor. Unintuitive and user-unfriendly system design
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emerged as a central theme in both cases as well. Interview participants also shared a
similarly weak understanding of their respective organization’s implementation goals.
Most simply assumed that by adopting electronic medical records, the organizations
were moving forward, entering the twenty-first century, and keeping up with the rest of
the country. The participants essentially saw the implementations as inevitable.
Despite the radical shift from paper-based to electronic nursing documentation,
disruption to the nursing workflow did not emerge as a significant theme throughout the
interviews with the Hospital B nurses. The Hospital A nurses, however, clearly feel that
the new system demands a disproportionate amount of their time, pulling them away
from their patients. The converse is true among the physicians. While disruption to
physician workflow did not emerge as a significant theme among the Hospital A
physicians, it did among the Hospital B physicians. Both the Hospital B physicians
themselves and their nurse counterparts stated that the physicians are spending less time
at the bedside and more time at the computer as a result of the implementation. They
maintained that this shift disrupts both the physician-patient relationship as well as the
physician-nurse relationship. Moreover, the situation is exasperated by the absence of
physician-accessible computers at the bedside.
Another theme which emerged out of the Hospital B case centered on HIT
system selection. Four of the seven interview participants expressed concerns regarding
their system’s ability to function effectively in their specialized care environment,
suggesting that perhaps the Cerner system was not the best choice for the PICU. While
three Hospital A interview participants – two critical care nurses and one emergency
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medicine physician – echoed similar concerns, the overall case study data did not
warrant the identification of a theme.
Two themes were unique to the Hospital A case. The first centered around the
system’s impact on the quality of physician documentation. Nine of the eighteen
physicians interviewed reported that the implementation adversely affected the quality of
physician documentation. In the Hospital B PICU, physician documentation remains
paper-based and was not impacted by the implementation. Therefore, a parallel theme
did not emerge from the Hospital B case.
The second unique theme centered on dissatisfaction with the end user system
training. The majority of the Hospital A interview participants found the training to be
boring, too long, inadequate in addressing the needs of their specialty or specific
workflow, helpful only as an introduction, or simply not helpful at all. While the
Hospital B interview participants did discuss their impressions of the system training
they had received, subsequent data analysis did not produce any significant thematic
similarities.
A summary of the major findings and how they relate to the literature,
conclusions, and recommendations are presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
The United States continues to lag behind other countries in its adoption of health
information technology (Chin, 2004; Jha et al., 2009). A 2006 survey of primary care
physicians found that only 29% of those in the United States were using electronic
medical record systems, compared to 98% in the Netherlands, 92% in New Zealand,
89% in the United Kingdom, 79% in Australia, and 42% in Germany (Schoen et al.,
2006). A failure to increase health information technology adoption in the United States
will jeopardize the nation’s ability to reduce medical errors, address the rapid growth of
healthcare costs, and enact effective healthcare reform (Blumenthal, 2009; Davenport,
2007).
Health information technology (HIT) implementation success factors as
perceived by healthcare executives and industry experts are well documented in the
literature. Few studies, however, have focused on the perceptions of HIT end users such
as physicians and nurses (Jensen & Aanestad, 2007). The purpose of this exploratory
case study was to describe the strategies, actions, and other factors that contribute the
successful implementation of HIT as perceived by HIT end users at two hospitals. That
is, this study sought the perspective of the HIT end user in answering the question: How
is HIT successfully implemented?
The case study research methodology was used because the investigator sought
to explain how an organizational process worked (Yin, 2009). Moreover, the investigator
had “clearly identifiable cases with boundaries and . . . [sought] to provide an in-depth
understanding of the cases” (Creswell, 2007, p. 74). The specific cases explored
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included an April 2008 HIT implementation at a 613-bed adult hospital (Hospital A) and
a September 2008 HIT implementation in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) at a
272-bed children’s hospital (Hospital B), both located in California.
Primarily, the study drew upon interview data. The investigator employed several
sampling strategies to recruit participants from each respective population that could
“purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem” (Creswell, 2007, p.
125). The investigator interviewed twenty-nine end users that experienced the April
2008 HIT implementation at Hospital A, and seven end users that experienced the
September 2008 HIT implementation at Hospital B. Factual details related to the HIT
implementation events were culled from secondary sources such as press releases, news
articles, and internal presentations. The investigator’s personal observations as a
participant in the Hospital A implementation were also considered when appropriate.
All interviews were conducted between January 15 and April 12 of 2010 and
ranged from 15 minutes to 30 minutes in length. The investigator took hand-written
notes during all interviews. With one exception, all interviews were also recorded using
a digital voice recorder and personally transcribed by the investigator. The transcripts,
along with the notes taken during the unrecorded interview, were then analyzed in three
phases consistent with the core elements of qualitative data analysis (Creswell, 2007).
To begin, the investigator reviewed the interview transcripts and secondary sources to
identify major organizing ideas. Following this coding phase, the investigator identified
patterns and combined codes into broader categories or themes. Using the constant
comparative method developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), the investigator attempted
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to saturate the categories. In the final phase, the investigator completed a cross-case
synthesis.
Major Findings
Analysis of the interview data led to the emergence of eight unique themes across
both cases which suggest factors that allow or inhibit HIT implementation success. In
the following section, these themes are reviewed and related to Kotter’s (1996) eightstep change model as appropriate.
Implementation goals. Across both cases, interview participants shared a
similarly weak understanding of their respective organization’s implementation goals.
The participants essentially saw the implementations as inevitable. Most participants
simply assumed that by adopting electronic medical records, their organizations were
moving forward, entering the twenty-first century, and keeping up with the rest of the
country. Several of the Hospital A physicians interviewed suggested that their
organization was perhaps not entirely forthcoming about their goals, namely those
related to increasing the efficiency of billing and coding. While the investigator was
unable to conclusively assess how this lack of communication impacted the success of
the respective implementations, he thought it a noteworthy finding that the participants
were largely unimpressed by their respective organizations’ efforts to communicate the
change vision.
Both steps one and four of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step process for leading
organizational change are relevant in this context. Step one is concerned with
establishing a sense of urgency. According to Kotter, if senior management does not
clearly communicate and illustrate the urgency of the issue or problem at hand, the
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organization will see little reason to support the change effort. “The likelihood that the
new behaviors and desired routines will be valued and adopted is higher when the target
group acknowledges the need for change” (Seijts, 2006, p. 180). While the study finding
suggests that the United States government and the media have already established a
nationwide sense of urgency, healthcare organizations should beware of organizational
complacency. Too much organizational complacency leads to resistance and ultimately,
a failed change effort (Kotter, 1996).
Step four of Kotter’s (1996) eight-stage process is concerned with
communicating the change vision. Both organizations clearly failed to effectively
communicate the change vision. “The real power of a vision is unleashed only when
most of those involved in an enterprise or activity have a common understanding of its
goals and direction. That shared sense of a desirable future can help motivate and
coordinate the kinds of actions that create transformations” (Kotter, 1996, p. 85). In
order to effectively communicate the change vision, Kotter suggests that
communications be presented using simple and concise language that is free of any
esoteric or technical jargon. Communications should make use of metaphors, analogies,
or examples where appropriate. Kotter also recommends the use of multiple
communication channels and repetition.
System selection. Another key finding supported across both cases, but
particularly Hospital B, centered on system selection. While a particular HIT system
might function effectively in a general care environment, it might not do so well in a
specialized care environment such as an intensive care unit or emergency department.
The Hospital B interview participants did not view the Cerner system as the best choice
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for the PICU. Instead of selecting a system better suited for a critical care environment –
and integrating that system with the general care system – the organization chose to
tweak the general care system in an attempt to make it work for the PICU. This strategy
resulted in a system that did not entirely meet the needs of its end users and, ultimately,
detracted from the perceived success of the implementation.
Step three of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step process for leading organizational change
is particularly relevant to this finding. Step three is concerned with developing a vision
and strategy. “Vision refers to a picture of the future with some implicit or explicit
commentary on why people should strive to create that future” (p. 68) and “strategy
provides both a logic and a first level of details to show how a vision can be
accomplished” (p. 75). A strategic mistake, such as selecting an inappropriate HIT
system, could undermine the change vision.
System usability. System usability issues were a dominant theme throughout most
of the interviews across both cases. Roughly half of the interview participants described
their system as unintuitive or user-unfriendly. The usability issues identified range from
not being able to effectively search through and sort medical records to not being able to
effectively document patient information due to data entry limitations. For specialized
care areas such as the Emergency Department and the Cardiac Care Unit, usability issues
particularly abound because the systems are not designed with their unique workflows in
mind. Collectively, the system usability issues detracted from the perceived success of
the two implementations.
This finding is consistent with the fifth step of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step process
for leading organizational change:
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Major internal transformation rarely happens unless many people assist. Yet
employees generally won’t help, or can’t help, if they feel relatively powerless. .
. . The purpose of stage five is to empower a broad base of people to take action
by removing as many barriers to the implementation of the change vision as
possible. (p. 102)
A poorly designed HIT system can quickly become a barrier in and of itself.
When “processes are seriously at odds with the new vision, you must deal with that fact
directly. Dodging the issue disempowers employees and risks undermining the change”
(p. 111). Healthcare organizations must align HIT systems to the vision. If end users are
unable to do their jobs effectively, the likelihood of improving the quality of patient care
is diminished. Bernstein et al. suggest that organizations should “foster end user
involvement throughout the entire scope of the integration process because the end users
are the individuals who will be using the new technology to perform their job” (2007, p.
23). Without end user involvement, the project team runs the risk of overlooking critical
workflow elements and usability issues (Thielst, 2007a; Valerius, 2007).
Training. The majority of the Hospital A interview participants described the
system training they received as boring, too long, inadequate in addressing the needs of
their specialty or specific workflow, helpful only as an introduction, or simply not
helpful at all. Participants would have preferred a phased approach to training or some
other form of follow-up, such as a formal class six months post-implementation focused
on optimizing their use of system. The poorly executed pre-implementation training and
the lack of follow-up clearly detracted from the perceived success of the implementation.
This finding as well is consistent with the fifth step of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step
process. Lack of appropriate training represents yet another barrier which disempowers
end users. Often
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training is provided, but it’s not enough, or it’s not the right kind, or it’s not done
at the right time. . . . People are given a course before they start their new jobs,
but aren’t provided with follow-up to help them with problems they encounter
while performing those jobs. (p. 108)
Kotter (1996) suggests two reasons why organizations often fall into this trap;
they either conduct an inadequate needs assessment or they choose not to invest the
necessary time and money to get the job done right:
We often don’t think through carefully enough what new behavior, skills, and
attitudes will be need when major changes are initiated. As a result, we don’t
recognize the kind and amount of training that will be required. . . . Second, we
sometimes do recognize correctly what is needed, but when we translate that into
time and money, we are overwhelmed by the results. (p. 108)
On-site support. Interview participants almost uniformly identified the presence
of twenty-four-by-seven on-site support during the initial weeks following activation as
a critical success factor. At Hospital A, the on-site support was provided by information
technology staff and a team of Epic-experienced consultants contracted by the hospital.
In addition, a subset of nurses and physicians served as Super Users. These Super Users
underwent additional training prior to activation so that they could support their
colleagues. Hospital B relied on Super Users as well. In addition, several physicians
from Cerner Corporation provided physician support during rounds for two weeks, there
was an extra resident on-site for two weeks, and the Medical Director for Clinical
Informatics rounded daily for three weeks.
This finding is consistent with the fifth step of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step process
for leading organizational change. “The purpose of stage five is to empower a broad base
of people to take action by removing as many barriers to the implementation of the
change vision as possible” (p. 102). This includes removing any barriers which limit
skill acquisition. For most end users, mastering a new HIT system is not likely to happen
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overnight. Twenty-four-by-seven on-site support empowers end users to learn on-thejob. If they get stuck or have a question, help is within an earshot.
Physician workflow. The Hospital B implementation’s negative impact on
physician workflow is another significant finding of this study. Prior to the
implementation, the physicians regularly visited their patients’ bedsides to review the
chart and write orders. Post-implementation, the physicians are spending less time at the
bedside and more time at the computer, disrupting both the physician-patient
relationship as well as the physician-nurse relationship. Part of the problem is system
usability; it takes longer to enter orders electronically. However, another part of the
problem is the lack of physician-accessible computers at the bedside. This lack of
supporting infrastructure detracts from the perceived success of the implementation.
This finding too is consistent with the fifth step of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step
process. Lack of supporting infrastructure, like poor usability, is yet another example of
a barrier which impedes success if ignored. “Dodging the issue disempowers employees
and risks undermining the change” (p. 111).
Nursing workflow. The Hospital A implementation’s negative impact on nursing
workflow is another significant finding of this study. Increased charting requirements as
a result of the implementation are demanding a disproportionate amount of the nurses’
time and pulling them away from patient care. Moreover, the impetus for increasing the
charting requirements is not clear to the nurses. From the nurses’ perspective, the often
feel they are asked to document additional information simply because the system allows
for that information to be documented. In other words, the additional charting
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requirements are not necessarily driven by a patient care need. This lack of workflow
optimization detracts from the perceived success of the implementation.
This finding is consistent with the fifth step of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step process.
The current workflow is at odds with the new vision. This lack of alignment represents
yet another barrier which disempowers end users. Healthcare organizations must align
workflow processes to the vision. If end users are unable to do their jobs effectively, the
likelihood of improving the quality of patient care is diminished, and ultimately, the
success of the implementation is undermined.
Physician documentation. Perhaps the most alarming finding to emerge from this
study is that the Hospital A implementation is adversely affecting the quality of
physician documentation. Prior to the implementation, progress notes were dictated.
Notes are now typed directly into the system, a task which is far more time-consuming
when compared to dictation. Studies have shown that “the average encounter takes three
to four times as long to document in an EMR as it does to dictate” (Nuance
Communications Corporation, 2008, p. 4). As a result, many physicians are not typing as
much as they would otherwise dictate, or are resorting to the use of shortcuts such as
cutting and pasting, dramatically reducing the quality of the documentation. The
Hospital A physicians are not alone in this regard. Other physicians have reported “that
EMRs slow them down and prevent them from documenting care in a manner that
accurately depicts the patient encounter” (Nuance Communications Corporation, 2008,
p. 2).
Once again, the fifth step of Kotter’s (1996) eight-step process for leading
organizational change sheds some light on the situation. In this context, the key barrier is
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lack of time; however poor system usability, inadequate typing skills, and cultural
resistance like play a role as well. Some organizations have addressed these barriers by
adopting speech recognition technology, allowing physicians to return to the more
familiar mode of dictating while still reducing transcription expenses (Nuance
Communications Corporation, 2008).
Conclusions
While all but one of the thirty-six physicians and nurses interviewed across both
cases characterized their respective implementations as successful, in most instances,
this characterization was given with reservations. The participants conceded that the
implementations did not cause any adverse events, nor did they generate any revolts, but
they also maintained that the implementations could have gone better. With this tenuous
declaration of success in mind, analysis of the interview data led to several conclusions:
1. Communication between the decision-makers and the end users was poor in
terms of expressing both the goals of the respective implementations, and the
rationale for selecting the chosen HIT system.
2. Poor usability design, lack of supporting infrastructure, and lack of workflow
optimization brought on serious side effects including a decrease in the quality of
physician documentation, an emphasis on financially-driven versus care-driven
charting, and disruption to provider-patient and physician-nurse relationships.
3. Intensive care units and other specialized care environments require equally
specialized HIT systems if they are to operate optimally; the one system fits all
strategy is detrimental to patient care.
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4. Less end user training prior to implementation in favor of more post-activation
on-site support and follow-up training would have represented a more effective
use of resources.
The implications made by these conclusions are that (a) the quality of care that end
users are able to provide their patients has been compromised, (b) end users are unable
to utilize their respective systems in an optimal manner, (c) end user job satisfaction is at
risk, (d) patient satisfaction is at risk, and (e) the organizations are at risk – the declining
quality of physician documentation in particular represents a serious liability.
Recommendations for Future HIT Adopters
Loppnow (2007) interviewed healthcare executives across eight different
healthcare organizations nationally recognized for their successful implementation of
HIT with the purpose of understanding what they perceived were the factors that enabled
their success. One of his observations stuck in the mind of this investigator:
The researcher realized in reviewing the transcripts and coding the interview
results that all 14 participants presumed a level of technical proficiency in their
implementation efforts. While some interviewees mentioned this issue indirectly
in the discussion of persistence in the face of occasional problems, it was evident
that every interview participant took technical proficiency for granted as an
element of success. The researcher concludes that in the absence of technical
proficiency, the organization could not fulfill the vision, nor could it enable
operational strategies, so technical capability of the organization and/or its
vendors appears to be a “given” in the perceptions of the interview participants
and not worthy of discussion as a success factor.
Of the eight unique themes which emerged out of this multiple-case study, five
are directly related to technical proficiency. This begs the question: Do healthcare
executives truly see technical proficiency as a given, or are they underestimating its
importance?
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By attempting to understand successful HIT implementation from the end user
perspective, lessons were learned that could be of value to other organizations
embarking on similar change projects. In particular, the investigator gleaned the
following implementation guidelines:
1. Clearly communicate the goals of the implementation.
2. Consider the unique needs of specialized care areas as you select an HIT
system.
3. Design wisely because usability does matter.
4. Provide the infrastructure necessary to support the implementation.
5. Provide the right training at the right time.
6. Provide plenty of on-site support during the initial weeks following
activation.
7. Optimize workflows to ensure the HIT system does not get in the way of
patient care.
Recommendations for Further Research
Much of the qualitative material extrapolated in this study could be focused upon
in a more quantitative fashion. A study might be undertaken in which an analysis of the
degree to which end users perceive an implementation as successful is correlated with
the findings of this study. Additionally, further research could be conducted to
understand success factors as perceived by other types of end users such as nursing
assistants, technicians, billers, and coders.
Furthermore, a study might be undertaken in which the quality of dictated
physician documentation is compared to the quality of computer-entered physician
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documentation. Finally, further research could be conducted to explore the advantages
and disadvantages of a phased end user training model.
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